Natural monopolies are a special case of monopoly where the 'normal' rules regarding regulation may not apply. Monopolies are the only firm in a market, and because of competition is absent there is no automatic check on their power.
When competition is absent, monopolies may exert their market power by charging excessively high prices or severely restricting supply onto the market. In both cases consumers will experience a fall in the welfare available to them - consumers pay more than the competitive market price, or they receive less than the competitive market supply. Hence, regulators are likely to seek ways to limit their dominance, such as by forcing the break-up of the monopoly, capping prices, or taxing super-normal profits.
However, with 'natural' monopolies the case for extreme regulation is much weaker. This is because competition against a natural monopolist might not be possible, or it might lead to a loss of welfare.
A key feature of markets or industries where natural monopolists exist is that only one firm can benefit from economies of scale.
These markets are characterised by very high fixed costs of supply, and include industries which rely on large-scale infrastructure such as cables, pipelines and networks, including gas and water supply, electricity and railways.
In these industries production costs continue to fall in the long run as the producer experiences continuous economies of scale. Once the first firm in the market has built the infrastructure (perhaps over many decades) it must supply as much as possible to benefit from economies of scale. For example, once an energy company has built its infrastructure is will have incurred a large proportion of its total costs. Every extra customer added will add very little to variable cost, but will make a contribution to revenue, and possibly add to profits.
Now imagine that, in order to break-even, the energy supplier must supply to at least 51% of potential customers. Indeed, there is an incentive to sell as much as possible as every unit sold continues to reduce long run average costs. If the incumbent has already met or exceed this threshold, then it would be commercially impossible for a rival firm to enter the market.
Minimum efficient scale (MES) is reached by a firm when the long run average cost of production (LRAC) it faces has reached a sufficiently low level to enable it to compete effectively in the market. This level will be relatively small for many firms, such as those competing in monopolistically competitive markets - including restaurants, local stores, and specialist service providers. However, for those natural monopolies with costly infrastructure to build and maintain - such as electricity and water suppliers - the level at which MES is reached may be much higher.
High fixed costs, and continuously falling long run average costs, means that only large firms may be able to survive and remain commercially viable - possibly needing to supply to most of the available market, and enjoy a market share in excess of 50% of the available market. If this is the case, it is highly unlikely that a 'challenger' will enter the market if the incumbent already has a market share of over 50%.
For example, assume that there are 100,000 electricity users in Anytown, and that there is only one supplier, the Anytown Electricity Company (AEC). We can also assume that AEC has gained from economies of scale as a result of building the infrastructure needed to supply Anytown residents, and that the unit costs of supply have come down to $1.00 per electricity unit. At this price, AEC can cover its costs and generate (at least) a normal profit.
Now, what if a rival to AEC, the New Electric Company (NEC), attempts to enter the market? In order to compete, it will need to get its unit cost down to at least $1.00 per unit. However, to achieve this low-cost electricity supply, NEC must also be able to benefit from economies of scale. This may only be achieved by gaining a significant market share - say, 25% (25,000 customers). However, this will mean building and operating an infrastructure which is capable of supplying to 25,000 homes. If it takes five years to build the infrastructure, and another three years to exploit it and gain the necessary economies of scale, it means that it will take at least eight years to breakeven. This will present a considerable barrier to entry, and is likely to deter entry.
However, if the necessary market share to achieve the economies of scale needed to arrive at the minimum efficient scale is over 50%, then (assuming the market has a fixed size of 100,000) it will be impossible for a new firm to enter. Of course, an innovative new entrant that is able to employ new technology and therefore reduce unit costs to $1 or below within a reasonable time frame may be able to enter and challenge the dominant natural monopolist.
In terms of competition policy, market regulation and deregulation, it can be argued that the most effective strategy regarding a natural monopolist is to allow a single owner of the infrastructure, and encourage competition between suppliers and distributors who can share use of the infrastructure. In our Anytown example, this might mean setting up a completely separate infrastructure owner - let's say, Anytown Electricity Network Company (AENC) - and then allow the existing (and potential) suppliers to bid for the right to use the infrastructure in order to supply to individual households. AENC could be privately owned, state owned or a public-private enterprise. The process of separating the various components of the supply-chain from the network is called unbundling.
This model is precisely the one used by many national governments when they privatised their utility industries towards the end of the 20th century. In some cases, the state becomes or continues to be the monopoly owner of the infrastructure (to avoid a wasteful duplication of resources) and private operators compete to supply from the network into homes. In other cases, the infrastructure is sold to the private sector, but heavily regulated.
As a general approach, national governments typically set the rules by which the market operates, including forcing unbundling, setting minimum service standards and environmental targets (such as decarbonisation), and setting objectives in terms of improving energy security.
Globally, there are various ways in which electricity markets operate. For example, in India, there are four main market players:
In the case of India, nearly 46% of electricity supply is owned by the private sector, 25% by the central government and 30% by state governments.
The problem faced by regulators in terms of setting a price cap to achieve allocative efficiency can be understood by considering the natural monopoly diagram.
Allocative efficiency will be achieved when the price (say, of electricity) - which is the average revenue (AR) - is equal to the marginal cost of supply (MC). [In the diagram, shown as point M, at output Q1.] At this price, what the consumer pays for a unit of output covers the marginal cost of supply - the condition for allocative efficiency.
If unregulated and under private control, natural monopolies can make super-normal profits, at 'Q' in the diagram, with profits at PABC. Profit maximisation (where MC=MR) also leads to relatively high prices and low output (at P and Q).
However, if the government or regulator sets a price (price cap) to achieve allocative efficiency (at N), the average cost of producing Q1 (at L on the LRAC curve) is greater than the average revenue (at M). This means that the price cap to achieve allocative efficiency results in a commercial loss of the area KLMN.
This could be resolved by a government subsidy equivalent to the loss.
In conclusion, natural monopolies involving infrastructure tend to be dealt with by unbundling the core network from the distribution to the consumer. Governments either retain monopoly control of the network, or privatise the network and tightly regulate the private owner in order to achieve various objectives - including, promoting efficiency, achieving 'green' objectives and, most recently, attempting to maintain energy security.
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