The second key role for the Bank of England is to help maintain financial stability. This means regulating the financial system to make it work effectively.
To achieve financial stability the Bank of England's Financial Policy Committee (FPC) undertakes macro-prudential regulation. Macro-prudential regulation focuses on the financial system as a whole. The FPC identifies, monitors and takes action to limit the build-up of system-wide (systemic) financial risk.
The bank’s Prudential Regulation Committee (PRC) is responsible for making decisions about micro-prudential regulation. Micro-prudential regulation means the regulation and supervision of individual firms in the financial services sector to ensure they are solvent and can cope with financial shocks, and that they work in the interests of consumers.
One of the roles of the FPC is to work with the PRC to design stress tests which assess bank’s ability to withstand shocks, and helps achieve the financial stability objective.
Regulation is also undertaken by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), which is separate from the Bank of England. Its job is to make sure that financial markets work effectively and that the conduct of firms in financial markets meets the standards laid down in legislation. The FCA is, effectively, the watchdog that ensures competition is maintained, and that banks and other financial institutions do not abuse their dominant positions. The FCA is also responsible for the prudential regulation of financial services firms not supervised by the PRA, including asset managers.
Bank failures are not a recent phenomenon and have periodically occurred since the origins of the modern banking system. Banks work largely on trust and simply do not have enough liquidity to meet customer's demand for cash should they all wish to withdraw their deposits at the same time. Confidence is important, and once customers believe that a bank has a liquidity problem they will rush to withdraw their funds, which will cause a bank to fail. Given that banks lend to each other, the failures can spread like a contagion throughout the banking system.
In the US alone, the Great Depression in the 1920s led to thousands of bank failures, which in turn helped drive the depression even deeper.
The main two causes of bank failures are inadequate liquidity, and inadequate capital assets.
To survive, a bank must have a sufficient liquidity ratio - that is, the ratio of liquid assets to liabilities. In simple terms, this means that its liquidity should be sufficient to cover expected cash withdrawals.
Secondly, a bank needs a healthy capital ratio, which is the ratio of its capital assets to loans it has advanced. Every loan that is made carries with it the risk of default and to prevent the bank from failing it must have capital reserves which is can draw upon to cover possible losses.
Prior to the financial crash, financial institutions were of the view that governments and central banks – as lenders of last resort - would cover any shortfall and deficiencies in their capital levels (capital adequacy), and ‘bail them out’. Of course, this creates a significant moral hazard as many banks thought they were simply ‘too big to fail’.
If borrowers believe that lenders will reschedule their debts, or simply write them off, there is an incentive not to act efficiently and make poor choices regarding how they use their loans, or how they operate their business or financial affairs. This is one of the reasons why credit markets in developing economies are less effective and charge high interest rates to cover the relatively high risk of defaulting on loans.
Adverse selection is also a possible financial market failure and is defined as making inefficient or irrational decisions as a result of inadequate information. For example, good quality borrowers may be rejected for loans because there is insufficient information about their creditworthiness.
In the financial crisis, many banks engaged in ‘liquidity hoarding’ because they assumed that lending would result in a bad outcome for the bank. [1]
In order to resolve some of the problems of adverse selection banks may raise interest rates in the hope that returns from good quality borrowers will cover the losses from poor quality borrowers. Of course, this penalises good quality borrowers who may simply withdraw from the market. Over time only poor quality borrowers are left, and the financial market itself becomes a ‘lemons’ market. [i]